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 Abstract  
In this introduction we briefly review the literature on intellectual property rights and 
access to medicines, identifying two distinct generations of research. The first generation 
analyzes the origins of new intellectual property rules, in particular the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
and the significance of TRIPS to developing countries. The second generation examines 
national-level experiences, as countries adjust their laws and practices to conform to TRIPS. 
Based on the insights provided by the articles in the special issue, we contribute to the second 
generation by considering a pair of overarching sets of issues. First, we  highlight the 
domestic political challenges that affect how countries go about implementing their new 
obligations under TRIPS. We argue that alliances and coalitions are necessary to underpin the 
use of policy instruments designed to conform to TRIPS while taking into account local 
conditions and needs, , and we present insights that allow us to understand why alliances and 
coalitions are difficult to construct and sustain in this area. Second, we explain why policies 
that many countries adopt in response to TRIPS often do not generate their desired or 
intended outcomes. In the last section of the introduction we review the articles that appear in 
this special issue.  
 Introduction
1
 
Global changes have national consequences. Changes in international rules affect 
national policies and practices, which in turn affect the people’s lives and livelihood. This 
special issue addresses these relationships by examining how changes in the rules of the 
international trade system can affect national development policies that bear on health.  
International trade rules may bear on health through a complex causal chain linking 
access to health to access to medicines, access to medicines to price of drugs, and price of 
drugs to intellectual property (IP) protection. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that one-third of the people living in developing countries are unable to receive or 
purchase essential medicines on a regular basis.
 2
 In pursuit of better health care outcomes, 
one of the many challenges governments face is improving access to medicines. And the 
price of drugs, in turn, can create challenges for improving access to medicines.  While 
health, access to medicines, and the price of drugs are, of course, a function of many factors, 
one important issue regards the role of intellectual property (IP). Where pharmaceutical firms 
have patents on drugs, they can, potentially, limit the competition they face and raise the 
price of drugs. 
This causal chain linking IP to health has become increasingly important and received 
a great deal of attention on account of major changes at the global level that mark the start of 
the 21
st
 Century. Specifically, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was founded in 
                                                          
1
 The special issue is a result of two workshops hosted by the Watson Institute for 
International Studies, Brown University. The first, on “Global Governance and Civil 
Society,” took place in October 2012; the second, on “Access to Medicines in the Global 
South,” took place in January 2014. We would like to thank Peter Evans for suggesting and 
co-organizing the workshops, and for his continuous support throughout this process. We 
would also like to thank Barbara Stallings for her support and guidance in bringing the 
collection of papers together in this special issue of the journal. Matthew Flynn, Anne 
Roemer-Mahler, Valbona Muzaka, and two anonymous reviewers provided invaluable 
comments on this introduction, for which we are grateful.  
2
 http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story002/en/ 
1995, it included the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). For the first time rules that affect national policies on IP were included in the 
international trade regime.  
TRIPS fundamentally reshaped the debate over access to medicines. Prior to TRIPS, 
countries had significant autonomy in designing and implementing their IP policies. 
Concerned about the effects that IP in pharmaceuticals might have on the price of drugs and 
health, for example, many countries did not allow patents in this area.
3
 TRIPS requires all 
countries to grant pharmaceutical patents. The extension of the international patent system to 
mandate coverage of pharmaceuticals, a major and unprecedented shift, has sparked 
widespread interest and concern over what impact it would have on access to medicines, 
especially in countries with limited resources.
4
 
Scholarship on the politics of IP and the IP-medicines-health nexus can be thought of 
in terms of two generations of research. The overwhelming amount of research on the topic, 
which constitutes the first generation, has examined changes to the global architecture: where 
the new IP rules came from and the significance of the changes in international rules for 
developing countries’ array of available policy options. A principal contribution of this 
research has been to show how IP became defined and treated as “trade-related” in the 1980s 
and 90s and, subsequently, integrated into the international trade regime. To explain this 
shift, analysts have focused principally on the lobbying activities of firms and trade 
                                                          
3
 Patents, which are a form of IP, constitute private property rights over knowledge and 
inventions.  
4
Among the many works addressing these concerns, see Lanjouw (2002), Lanoszka (2003), 
Barton (2004), Chaudhuri (2005), Roffe et al (2005), Corriat et al (2006), Coriat (2008), 
Malbon and Lawson (2008), La Croix and Liu (2008), Aginam, Harrington, and Yu (2013), 
Lofgren et al (2013). 
associations from pharmaceuticals (and other IP-sensitive sectors) that sought greater 
protection on a global scale.
5
  
The results of these efforts include TRIPS, of course, but more generally the 
prominent place that IP plays in the foreign economic policies of the world’s leading powers. 
After all, TRIPS is hardly the only international agreement on IP that affects developing 
countries – it is not even the only “trade-related” international agreement on IP that affects 
developing countries. Throughout this period both the USA and the European Union have 
negotiated bilateral trade agreements that also include IP provisions, provisions that typically 
exceed those in the WTO.
6
  
Intrinsically linked to scholarship on the making of new international rules, and also 
part of the first generation, is research on what these rules imply for developing countries’ 
policy choices (Reichman 1996; Correa 2000b; Watal 2001; Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights 2002; Weissman 1996). Here it is important to underscore that TRIPS 
constitutes a set of minimal standards to which countries comply, leaving opportunities for 
cross-national variation in how they do so. That is, within the constraints established by the 
new global regime, countries have “flexibilities.”7 For example, in the area of 
pharmaceuticals, TRIPS requires countries to grant pharmaceutical patents – but it left some 
discretion regarding the timing of when they began to do so and other issues related to 
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 Countless studies have highlighted the role of transnational pharmaceutical firms in pushing 
for stronger patent protection. See, among others, Paine and Santoro (1992), Drahos (1995), 
Ryan (1998), Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Matthews (2002), Sell (2003), Pugatch (2004), 
Sell (2010a), Muzaka (2011), Roemer-Mahler (2013). 
6
 Among the many works that contrast the IP provisions in the WTO and regional and 
bilateral trade agreements, see Fink and Reichenmiller (2005), Shadlen (2005), El-Said (2005 
and 2007), Mercurio (2006), Morin (2006 and 2009), Sell (2007 and 2010), Krikorian and 
Szymkowiak (2007), Deere (2008). 
7
 Examination of countries’ flexibilities within the new international IP environment is 
consistent with – and part of – broader analyses of “policy choice” in the context of new 
global economic regimes (UNDP 2003; Gallagher 2013). 
implementation of this new obligation.
8
 Likewise, once patents are granted, TRIPS requires 
minimal standards of protection, but, again, how countries go about complying with these 
new standards can vary from country to country in ways that affect, de facto, the balance of 
power between the actors who own the patents and the actors that seek to use proprietary 
knowledge.  
In the period since TRIPS came into affect, research on the international regime and 
policy implications has focused largely on the “Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health,” which was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001. The 
Doha Declaration itself did not alter the TRIPS Agreement; it is a simple seven-paragraph 
document that affirms what was already in TRIPS. Yet by clarifying the rules and removing 
ambiguity as to what steps were acceptable under TRIPS, and most importantly by 
underscoring countries’ rights to implement their new international IP obligations in health-
supportive ways, the Doha Declaration aimed to facilitate the use of flexibilities. Related to 
the Doha Declaration was a subsequent agreement that addressed specific problems of 
countries with insufficient manufacturing capabilities, by addressing the conditions under 
which drugs could be exported from countries where they are patented to specifically 
designated countries.
9
  
Complementing and building on the research on international IP rules and their 
implications, a second generation of research examined national-level implementation and 
the “on the ground” effects of these grand changes. Here, analytic attention shifts from the 
constraints that the global political economy presents to the actions taken by countries in 
response. This is a natural progression. After carefully analyzing the processes by which new 
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 Countries that did not grant pharmaceutical patents as of the start of TRIPS had until 2005 
to do so. Countries varied in how much of this transition period they utilized. 
9
 We refer here to the “Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” adopted in August 2003. For 
analyses of these events, see, among others, Chorev (2012), Shadlen (2004), Abbott and 
Reichman  (2007).  
international rules were created, it is logical for scholars to examine how and the extent to 
which these were implemented at the national level, especially given the built-in flexibilities 
in the international agreement.   
The literature on TRIPS implementation includes a proliferation of case studies, both 
single-country and cross-national, providing fresh observations of what is happening on the 
ground in various parts of the world. We do not purport to review this whole body of works 
here, rather we wish to point to some of the various explanatory factors that have been 
invoked. For example, Deere’s (2008) cross-national analysis of TRIPS implementation 
points to the role of wide range of factors, including international pressures, state capacities, 
inter-agency coordination, and government volition. Drahos’s (2010) analysis of patent 
offices in the developing world considers the role of technical assistance as a source of 
socialization. May (2004) and Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006) also examine the role of 
technical assistance in shaping national policies. Matthews’s (2011) analysis of IP 
policymaking in Brazil, India, and South Africa focuses on the role of non-governmental 
actors. Nunn (2009) traces the driving force of social mobilization in the Brazilian approach 
to pharmaceutical patents, while Flynn (2015) emphasizes the important role that health 
activists in the state bureaucracy played in pushing the Brazilian government to utilize TRIPS 
flexibilities. Eren-Vural’s (2007) analysis of India and Turkey and Shadlen’s (2009) 
comparison of patent policies in Brazil and Mexico both emphasize the importance of 
industrial structure for coalition formation.
10
 Ultimately, work on national-level IP politics 
remains incipient and eclectic. In contrast to the first generation of research discussed above, 
which offers a clear narrative of governments responding to business lobbying and reshaping 
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In addition to the works cited in the text, many edited volumes with chapters on individual 
cases of IP policymaking have been published. A non-comprehensive list includes Coriat 
(2008), Haunss and Shadlen (2009), Shaver (2010), Shaver and Rizk (2010), Shadlen, 
Guennif, Guzman, and Lalitha (2011), Lofgren and Williams (2013), Dreyfuss and 
Rodriguez-Garavito (2014). 
international rules, as well as a consensus on the existence of flexibilities within the new 
international rules, the second generation of research, to this point, offers a much less 
coherent explanation of the factors influencing patterns of TRIPS implementation. Nor has 
the IP literature examined the effects of these policy choices.  
The articles in this special issue contribute in important ways to this emerging second 
generation of scholarship. We consider two overarching sets of issues: the making of policies 
in response to the new international environment, and the consequences of their 
implementation. With respect to both inquiries, the articles offer new perspectives concerning 
the processes leading to the enactment of flexibilities and the impact those have once enacted. 
Thus, in contributing to this second generation of scholarship on IP, and access to medicines, 
and health, the special issue provides fresh theoretical and empirical insights that contribute 
to our understanding of the politics of global policies more broadly. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter consists of three sections. We begin by 
discussing the principal insights that the authors bring with regard to IP policymaking, TRIPS 
implementation, and the use of flexibilities. We then discuss their analyses with regard to the 
effects of policy measures taken. In the final section we offer brief summaries of each article 
in the special issue. 
Using Flexibilities: Rethinking Conditions and Strategies  
Implicit in the first generation of research is an expectation that, were the international 
context less restrictive, countries would utilize more creative policies and take advantage of 
available policy space to improve access to affordable medicines. Yet in IP policy, as in other 
areas of economic policy, levels of under-utilization are remarkable (Correa 2000a; Oliveira 
et al. 2004; Musungu and Oh 2006). These observations are typically treated with laments, 
that governments lack awareness to exploit TRIPS flexibilities, or that bilateral pressures and 
bilateral trade agreements inhibit the use of flexibilities, or that the nature of technical 
assistance creates biases against doing so. IP is technical indeed, and external pressures and 
biased technical assistance are well documented, but these factors cannot adequately explain 
the level of flexibility utilization. After all, many governments have resisted (and continue to 
resist) pressures for stronger IP at the global level, so lack of awareness is an unconvincing 
explanation. Nor do external pressures, trade agreements, and technical assistance adequately 
account for the variation. Not all countries have trade agreements with the US,
11
 and not all 
countries will be vulnerable to threats of trade sanctions or other types of external pressures. 
Thus, while international politics certainly play an important role, the analyses in this 
collection point to the domestic political challenges to utilizing TRIPS flexibilities. In 
particular, the articles suggest that alliances and coalitions are necessary to underpin the use 
of flexibilities, and these are difficult to construct and sustain.  
In thinking about the challenges to constructing and sustaining coalitions in support of 
the use of TRIPS flexibilities, consider the positions of three critical actors in “access to 
medicines” campaigns: global health activists, local health activists (including other NGOs), 
and domestic pharmaceutical firms. The sites of contention were often in the Global South, 
where governments had to catch up with IP laws long established in industrial countries, 
while global activists were often organized in the Global North – although there were 
certainly important instances of South-South collaborations too (Veras 2014). The global 
activists’ approach has been informed by a commitment to retaining and using TRIPS 
flexibilities. The movement largely coalesced around the battles over flexibilities in the late 
1990s, particularly in the run-up to the 2001 Doha Declaration (’t Hoen 2002; Kapczynski 
2008; Kapstein and Busby 2013). The claim that expanded flexibilities is essential for 
improving access to medicines has subsequently turned into the cornerstone of global 
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 Furthermore, as discussed below, it is not clear that developing countries have 
underutilized TRIPS flexibilities because they have bilateral trade agreements with the US 
and EU, or that countries have such trade agreements because they have underutilized TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
activism, and its source of legitimation. To be sure, the global health activists studied by the 
authors here are keenly aware of the fact that improving health depends on multiple issues, 
not just access to medicines, and that access to medicines is not solely a function of IP 
policies. The state of patents and patent protection may have significant effects on access to 
medicines in any given country, but so too do the proximity of health clinics and countless 
other things. Yet while global health activists would hardly deny the importance of the other 
obstacles that resource-poor countries, in particular, face in their attempt to provide the 
population needed medicines, the overriding focus has been on IP. The campaigns are 
informed by a conviction that relaxing IP rules are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
improved access to medicines. Or, to put it differently, that the use of flexibilities – including 
compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and minimal protection of test data, as well as 
strict rules for patentability – are instrumental for improving access to medicines and 
improving public health outcomes. 
Our point here is not to debate this causal logic; few would dispute that the path to 
access to medicines passes through IP, nor would many disagree that more than IP alone 
affects access to medicines. Our point, rather, is to show how this orientation and emphasis 
can affect the process of alliance formation in domestic settings. The challenge is that while 
local health activists may share global activists’ goal of improving access to affordable and 
high-quality medicines, they may embrace different approaches and strategies to achieve that 
goal. For example, local health activists may prioritize lowering prices, which they may 
believe can be accomplished without the explicit use of IP flexibilities, or they may regard 
the quality and state of countries’ health care systems as more essential for improving access 
to medicines than utilizing flexibilities and relaxing levels of patent protection. In some 
cases, local activists may not even share the concern with improving access to medicines. As 
Godoy shows, in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, activists with a different approach 
to health came to resent – or at least greet with caution – the global activists’ IP-oriented 
approach. Local activists feared that a focus on TRIPS flexibilities placed too much trust in 
the efficiency of market competition, could lead to an overly industrial-biomedical 
“pharmaceuticalization” approach to health, and would likely undermine the basic health care 
approach they preferred.  
Why this gap between global and local approaches? It is not difficult to understand 
global activists’ emphasis on IP. More than many public health initiatives, ideas about the IP-
access-health link are easier to diffuse across international boundaries and seem easier to 
implement. They are easy to diffuse because they draw on an accessible message that 
effectively creates “villains” in the form of multinational pharmaceutical companies oblivious 
to nothing but their profits. They are easy to diffuse also because of the promise of the 
relative simplicity of implementation. After all, IP changes seem to only require a legislative 
act, in contrast to initiatives that may also require resources, the presence of competent 
bureaucrats, skilled health workers, or improvements to health care infrastructure. IP policy 
changes also tend to be discrete events. Actors focus on specific elements of a country’s IP 
law to change, legislators make changes, and when the law is changed it is difficult (though 
certainly not impossible) to reverse. Alternative measures, such as reforms to healthcare 
systems, in contrast, involve multiple parts that need to be coordinated and more likely 
require significant follow-up. Initiatives such as the development of local pharmaceutical 
production might be even more challenging, as shown by Russo and Banda. The point, then, 
is that alliances between global and local health activists may be unstable, not because of the 
former’s naivety about what is happening on the ground or the latter’s indifference to IP, but 
simply because of a set of factors that may drive both sets of actors to prioritize different sets 
of issues. In short, alliances between global and local activists – two sets of actors that both 
care about health – may be anything but naturally occurring outcomes. Rather, they need to 
be established and, at times, they may fail to materialize due to distinct interests, priorities, 
and strategies.  
Our papers also suggest that there may be geographical and temporal patterns to the 
likelihood of alliances between global and local activists. Andia’s article hints at the 
possibility that such alliances are more likely to happen in countries that are “trend setters,” 
where local activists recruit global activists, than among the countries that are followers, 
where global activists recruit local participants. Chorev, in turn, suggests the possibility of a 
diminishing interest of civil society in IP issues, especially as conflicts become more arcane 
and difficult to comprehend, as was the case with the Anti-Counterfeit Act in Kenya.  
Nor do local pharmaceutical firms, when those exist, always fit easily or naturally into 
global campaigns in support of the implementation and use of flexibilities. Again, this may 
appear surprising, as we expect local pharmaceutical firms in developing countries to oppose 
stronger patent rights, but these firms may not place such emphasis on patents per se. After 
all, most pharmaceutical firms in most countries focus on selling older drugs that are beyond 
the period of potential patent protection. For such drugs, patents, or lack of patents, are 
irrelevant. Even where local firms used to produce and market their own versions of drugs 
that would otherwise have been patented (if the country were to have a pharmaceutical patent 
regime), few do so any longer because of TRIPS. Remember, the issue here is the use of 
flexibilities once countries have implemented TRIPS, and not TRIPS implementation per se, 
i.e. how to go about creating provisions that mitigate the effects of pharmaceutical patents, 
but not whether or not to allow pharmaceutical patents. Quite simply, TRIPS compelled 
countries to introduce pharmaceutical patents and, in turn, compelled firms to adjust to this 
new status quo. If local firms’ own business models do not depend on TRIPS flexibilities, 
then their participation in alliances to use such flexibilities may not be forthcoming. 
Furthermore, some of the measures that might be supported by local health activists may 
incur the wrath of local firms. Health activists may seek price controls, for example, which 
could obviously impinge on firms’ profits. Likewise health activists may lower barriers to 
drug imports, to lower prices. Health activists may also seek more stringent and rigorously 
enforced health regulations, such as requirements to attain certification of production 
facilities or demonstrate bioequivalence of follow-on drugs, regulations to which compliance 
can be costly for local firms. In other cases, as Russo and Banda imply, local pharmaceutical 
firms may at time rely for technical and other support on international support, including 
from multinational pharmaceutical companies.   
The articles provide illustrations of these conflicting interests and tensions. Godoy 
shows, for example, that local drug manufacturers had other considerations, outside of 
pharmaceuticals, that made them support the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) in spite of the “TRIPS-plus” provisions in the agreement that, we might expect, 
would trigger opposition. Chorev shows that the local pharmaceutical industry in Kenya 
supported flexibilities in the debate over the Intellectual Property Act but sided with 
multinational pharmaceutical companies in the court case regarding the Anti-Counterfeit Act. 
In debates over the Anti-Counterfeit Act, Kenyan pharmaceutical firms found themselves 
more closely allied with the transnational pharmaceutical sector than health activists, since 
they, too, prefer to keep less expensive imported drugs out of the local market. In other work, 
Shadlen (2011) examines the tensions in the alliance between local activists and local 
pharmaceutical firms in Brazil, as the local pharmaceutical sector in Brazil has provided more 
consistent support for the government’s stance on compulsory licensing than on the inclusion 
of the health agency in pharmaceutical patent examination.  
The extent to which alliances between transnational activists and local actors exist 
may have important implications for policy outcomes. Godoy suggests that the adoption of 
CAFTA in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala could be regarded as a failure of global 
activists but not as a failure of local health activists, who never really mobilized against the 
agreement. Andia shows that the paths taken in reducing the price of Kaletra in Ecuador and 
Colombia was different from the paths in Brazil and Thailand precisely because in the first 
pair of countries local activists were not as supportive of the measures as in the latter pair. 
Although it is beyond the scope of their papers, it is also easy to imagine that the laws 
governing secondary patenting in Brazil and India, studied by Sampat and Shadlen, have 
been influenced by the interplay between global and local forces; similarly, the industrial 
policies affecting local pharmaceutical production, the subject of Russo and Banda’s piece, 
may be influenced by the support (or lack thereof) of local health activists. The punchline is 
that the support of local activists is important at the level of policy-making, but possibly even 
more so at the stage of implementation. As Godoy suggests, “the transnational gaze is always 
fleeting; ultimately, unless local activists take up an issue, any gains made during the period 
of the transnational campaigning may be short-lived.” 
These observations mean that we need to be much more attentive not only the local-
specific interests of the many actors involved in making and implementing policies in any 
given setting, but also to the specific political economic contexts in which activists and other 
relevant actors function, for it is these contexts that will shape actors’ position and the 
possibility of alliances. Much of the scholarship treats the politics of IP as if it were a 
universe of its own, as if the conflicts over different aspects of IP policy (international, 
regional, national) occurred in a silo. But IP is always a part of broader set of issues, part of a 
broader political economy. Indeed, this is one of the first lessons of the early research 
reviewed above: IP was made “trade-related” and thus addressed in the context of trade 
negotiations. Yet subsequent discussion has had a tendency to focus on IP on its own terms. 
Consider, for example, the abundant literature on IP in regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, referred to above. We know that regional and bilateral trade agreements typically 
include IP provisions that, because they exceed those in the WTO, are typically regarded with 
alarm. Yet these agreements are about much more than IP. What much of this work seems to 
overlook is that “TRIPS Plus” trade agreements also include benefits, in terms of enhanced 
market access for non-traditional exports, which also exceed what is available in the WTO 
(Shadlen 2005). That is not to say that the agreements, on the net, are “good” (i.e. that the 
benefits for developing countries outweigh the costs), but simply to draw our attention to the 
fact that agreements of this sort are founded on trade-offs. In the context of making trade-offs 
the actors opposed to the IP provisions may prevail, or their concerns may get subordinated.
12
 
It is incumbent on political analyses to understand how actors concerned with IP interact with 
other actors with different concerns.  
Broadening the analytic lens to look beyond IP per se is useful for consideration of 
domestic laws too. After all, the Anti-Counterfeit Act in Kenya, for example, was concerned 
with many more commodities and products than medicines, which necessarily affected the 
support and opposition to it in Parliament as well as civil society. Grounding the analysis of 
IP in this way, we believe, will not only allow us to better understand actors’ positions, 
actions and possible successes in the struggles over intellectual property rights, but will also 
improve dialogue between scholars of IP and scholars of international political economy and 
development. While IPE and development scholarship provide useful analytical tools for 
sharpening the analysis of IP; the empirically rich IP scholarship is a particularly fertile 
ground for applying and development new arguments and theories relevant for IPE and 
development.  
Using Flexibilities: Rethinking the Effects  
In spite of the challenges to building and sustaining alliances, many countries have 
taken steps to utilize TRIPS flexibilities and resisted attempts to curtail the use of 
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 Frischtak (1995) also points to the new trade-offs and challenges that inform IP 
policymaking in “open economies.” 
flexibilities. Many countries now have laws that permit and facilitate compulsory licensing, 
for example, or that place restrictions on secondary patenting. Indeed, many “TRIPS Plus” 
provisions have been relaxed, as many of the articles in this special issue illustrate. However, 
these articles also suggest that, even when all the pieces are lined up and the alliances come 
together, the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities may not have the desired outcomes. 
Andia finds that even though in both Colombia and Ecuador compulsory licensing was 
permitted by law, and in Ecuador a compulsory license was issued, both countries continued 
to purchase the patented version of the drug Kaletra, rather than generic versions. Moreover, 
Andia argues that the compulsory licenses themselves cannot explain the price reductions that 
these countries secured. Sampat and Shadlen’s analysis of secondary patenting in Brazil and 
India also forces us to think about how effective touted TRIPS flexibilities may be in 
practice.  Both countries’ patent laws include provisions that could potentially minimize 
secondary patenting, but these authors find that India has a surprisingly low rejection rate of 
secondary patents, and that where applications for secondary patents are rejected, rarely is 
this directly attributable to the specific mechanisms in place to achieve this goal. The grant 
rate for secondary patents appears to be lower in Brazil, but, again, the direct effects of the 
specific measure put in place to achieve this goal are less than one might expect.  
One reason for this gap between intentions and outcomes, of course, is the complexity 
involved in improving access to medicines and health. As discussed above, these outcomes 
are affected by myriad factors, so that even successfully implemented TRIPS flexibilities 
may have only marginal effects on overall outcomes. Even if we look not at the overall goal 
of improved access to drugs but the more immediate goals, such as lowering the price of a 
particular drug or the rate of secondary patenting, complexity may contribute to the minimal 
impacts these studies report. Measures that may make sense in theory are often hard to use in 
practice. Producing drugs locally to get around IP barriers imposed by TRIPS may seem 
logical, but as Russo and Banda show, in practice it is enormously complex. Minimizing the 
grant of secondary patents may seem simple, but Sampat and Shadlen’s analysis of the 
experiences of India and Brazil indicate that it is anything but.  
Another reason why the effects of TRIPS flexibilities are often less than expected is 
because the terrain of debate has been narrowed. Chorev’s study on the anti-counterfeit 
debate in Kenya, where activists were able to successfully challenge some provisions of the 
Anti-Counterfeit Act, suggests that the stakes of at least some of the disputes over flexibilities 
may simply be lower than what health activists believe. In a similar vein, Sampat and 
Shadlen’s analysis shows that Brazil granted fewer secondary patents than India, but 
nevertheless had more drugs covered by patents, because of earlier decisions made in the 
1990s with regard to when and how to comply with TRIPS and introduce pharmaceutical 
patents. To put it simply, while TRIPS and the initial fight over flexibilities had important 
implications, subsequent policy choices might not be as consequential.  
Our analysis of effectiveness has important implications for contemporary analysis of 
IPE. Much of the post-Uruguay Round political conflict has been about the existence and use 
of “policy space,” i.e. what sorts of measures countries can put in place, and what sorts of 
barriers (de jure and de facto) countries face in using this policy space. We have focused on 
this debate over IP, but analogous issues and debates emerge in a variety of issue areas 
(Gallagher 2013, Abbott 2009, Maskus 2010). Implicit in discussions of policy space is the 
expectation, or at least hope, that such measures, if taken, would have their desired effects. 
But they may not. These articles offer two ways of thinking about the gap between the 
outcomes intended by policy changes and the actual outcomes yielded by policy changes.  
One possible interpretation offered here is that TRIPS flexibilities may not yield the 
benefits that are expected because they are challenging to implement and enforce. This view 
is consistent with a long tradition of scholarship. We know from the distinction between “law 
in books” and “law in action” and from the institutional analysis of policy-making that new 
laws do not often bring about the intended outcomes. Laws create opportunities; they set 
boundaries of permissible and non-permissible action. But opportunities need to be seized; 
and sometimes actors expected to seize opportunities for action lack the interests for doing 
so, or the necessary resources for doing so; or actors who would be disadvantaged by the 
enforcement of a law counter-mobilize. In such cases, we should indeed expect to witness 
gaps between the outputs that laws allow and the outputs that we observe. 
A second interpretation, also offered here, is that “counter-hegemonic globalization” 
measures, of which TRIPS flexibilities are an example, can only have minimal impact even 
when implemented and enforced, independently of the social forces on the ground. Domestic 
laws may simply not be effective means to mitigate the effects of the new status quo 
introduced by TRIPS and other international agreements. The much-touted TRIPS 
flexibilities are not functional substitutes for measures that are now prohibited by TRIPS. 
Pharmaceutical markets and health care systems are likely to operate differently – 
fundamentally differently –in a world marked by TRIPS, with pharmaceutical patents, even if 
countries actively used their flexibilities in terms of restricting the grant of some patents, 
threatening and issuing compulsory licenses, allowing parallel imports, embarking on local 
production, and so on. The world has changed, and the use of flexibilities cannot restore the 
pre-TRIPS order. Chorev’s article speaks clearly and explicitly to this issue: over time, the 
stakes become smaller. This means that the potential achievements of some legal changes are 
small.  If the room for dispute has narrowed, then we need to reconsider our expectations of 
just how much significant change on the ground we should expect to observe as a result of 
policy reforms.  
Summary of papers 
The authors contributing to this special issue are all concerned with the question of 
access to medicines, but draw on different case studies and come to distinct conclusions.  
Chorev is interested in the trajectory leading from one IP-related dispute to another. 
She studies the struggles over the legislation of two laws in Kenya, the Industrial Property 
Act, 2001, which included a number of important flexibilities and was as a result supported 
by health activists, and the Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008, which, activists argued, threatened 
some of the flexibilities gained in the Industrial Property Act. Looking at the debates over 
each law, the paper argues that, contrary to the activists’ claims, the stakes of the second 
dispute were much lower – indeed, secondary – than the stakes in the earlier dispute. The 
paper argues that this is typical to international disputes and explains why that is the case.  
Godoy explains why transnational health activists were not able to successfully 
mobilize local activists in Central America against the escalation of IP requirements in the 
context of CAFTA’s ratification debates.  The article spells out the tension between the 
considerations and interests motivating the agenda of global activists, local health activists, 
and local pharmaceutical producers. The analysis situates local actors within the specific 
political and economic contexts, identifying, rather than assuming, these actors’ goals and 
strategies. In doing so Godoy reveals the potential mismatches between with the goals and 
strategies of the various actors involved in the political economy of pharmaceutical IP in 
Central America.  
Andia is interested not only in the political processes leading to the introduction of 
flexibilities (compulsory licensing) in various countries, but in the political processes 
affecting the utility of the policies once in place. Comparing price reductions of the brand-
name antiretroviral drug Kaletra in Colombia and Ecuador, Andia also emphasizes the 
tensions between global and local activists in policy formation. Yet Andia also shows that the 
extent to which local actors are invested in a law influences its successful implementation 
even more so than its enactment.  
Sampat and Shadlen use original datasets of governments’ decisions regarding 
secondary patenting to assess the effects of flexibilities on access to medicines. Their 
analyses of pharmaceutical patent examination in Brazil and India offer comparisons of the 
distinct filing and examination patterns in these countries, placing the countries’ practices 
with regard to secondary patents in the context of their larger trajectories of TRIPS 
implementation. They find that, in both countries, the effects of the measures to address 
secondary patenting were outshadowed by the effects of earlier choices regarding the 
introduction of pharmaceutical patents in the first place.  
In the final paper, Russo and Banda explore another aspect of access to medicines – 
the local manufacturing of drugs. They describe the opportunities and obstacles of drug 
manufacturing in Mozambique and Zimbabwe and assess how political-economic conditions 
may lead countries in different paths.  
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